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Abstract— The paper proposes an on-line monitoring frame-
work for continuous real-time safety/security in learning-based
control systems (specifically application to a unmanned ground
vehicle). We monitor validity of mappings from sensor inputs
to actuator commands, controller-focused anomaly detection
(CFAM), and from actuator commands to sensor inputs,
system-focused anomaly detection (SFAM). CFAM is an im-
age conditioned energy based generative adversarial network
(EBGAN) in which the energy based discriminator distinguishes
between proper and anomalous actuator commands. SFAM
is based on an action condition video prediction framework
to detect anomalies between predicted and observed temporal
evolution of sensor data. We demonstrate the effectiveness of
the approach on our autonomous ground vehicle for indoor
environments and on Udacity dataset for outdoor environments.
I. INTRODUCTION
The development of algorithms for autonomous navigation
of robotic systems in complex unstructured environments
is attracting significant research interest due to emergence
of more accurate and cheaper sensors, faster embedded
computing devices (e.g., GPUs), and vast amounts of data.
Particularly, learning-based algorithms are widely used due
to the large sets of available data to train either the percep-
tion subsystems or the end-to-end control policy for robust
autonomous operation of the robotic system [1], [2].
These learning-based systems cannot be trained in all
possible environments and environmental conditions. Such
systems are also vulnerable to adversarial attacks [3], [4].
Recently, approaches have been proposed to address this
challenge based on generative modeling [5], [6] and gradient
based search [7]. Formal verification [8] and Bayesian opti-
mization [9] are promising but are computationally complex.
For real-time detection of anomalies/malfunctions in a
cyber-physical system [11], [12], we propose the frame-
work in Figure 1 which combines complementary anomaly
monitoring methods [10], [13], namely controller-focused
anomaly monitor (CFAM) and system-focused anomaly
monitor (SFAM). CFAM uses an image-conditioned EBGAN
to validate the mapping from the sensor data to the actuator
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Fig. 1. The proposed learning-based anomaly detection framework for
continuous real-time monitoring of an autonomous closed-loop system [10].
command. SFAM uses an action conditioned video prediction
system to validate the mapping from the system action to the
sensor data. The proposed learning-based anomaly detection
framework continuously validates and verifies autonomous
operation during run-time. Novel aspects of this study are:
• A learning-based on-line framework to monitor the
controller and the system behavior.
• A conditional EBGAN architecture to detect anomalies
in controller outputs.
• An action conditioned video prediction framework to
detect anomalies in system behavior.
• A methodology to train a robust video prediction archi-
tecture to detect anomalies.
This paper is organized as follows. The background and
the problem are discussed in Section II. The architecture,
training methodology, and anomaly detection for CFAM
and SFAM are described in Section III. Section IV reports
results on indoor (collected from our experimental unmanned
ground vehicle) and outdoor (Udacity [14]) datasets. Sec-
tion V concludes the paper.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The presented anomaly detection applies to any closed-
loop system such as an autonomous vehicle. In this paper, we
consider an unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) instrumented
with camera(s) and LIDAR and controlled by an end-to-end
learning system. The input command to the vehicle is ut at
time step t with the corresponding sensor output, xt.
The CFAM operates on the stream of sensor data and
actuator commands to monitor validity of the mapping
x → u and detects anomalies related to the controller.
These anomalies can be due to distributional shift (e.g.,
when the testing and training environments are different) or978-1-5386-5541-2/18/$31.00 c©2018 IEEE
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Fig. 2. Conditional energy based generative adversarial network (CEBGAN) framework for CFAM.
due to sensor malfunctions/failures/attacks. The approach for
CFAM is based on learning sensor data (image) conditioned
energy based generative adversarial network (CEBGAN) in
Figure 2 which outputs low energy for valid actuator (steer-
ing) commands and high energy for anomalous commands.
The SFAM monitors the validity of the (dynamic) mapping
u → x from system action to sensor data (over a time
horizon into future) and detects anomalies generated due
to malfunctions in the system. Malfunctions/anomalies can
occur due to environmental perturbation (e.g., slippery road)
or partial/full subsystem failure (e.g., electrical, mechanical)
which causes the system to not act according to the given
actuator command. The framework addresses this problem
by learning the dynamics of the overall system based on
action conditioned video prediction as shown in Figure 4. In
the implementation, the framework takes as input xt−3:t and
actuator commands ut−2:t+1 to predict xt+1, which is used
to validate the system action to system data mapping. The
video prediction and anomaly detection architectures for the
proposed framework are shown in Figures 3 - 5.
III. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
A. Image conditioned EBGAN
1) Model architecture: Motivated by the success of GANs
[15] in a variety of applications, we propose to use discrim-
inator in GAN for CFAM. We combine conditional-GAN
[16] with EBGAN [17], to generate CEBGAN and explore
its potential to detect controller generated anomalies.
Inputs to the generator are noise vector z sampled uni-
formly from (0, 1) and condition image x. Discriminator
inputs are actuator command u and condition image x. The
discriminator learns to map inputs u and x to a scalar
value (Energy), while the generator learns to predict steer-
ing command from the condition image.The discriminator
output is computed as mean square error between input
steering command u and the condition x driven steering
command prediction. For CFAM, the discriminator is the key
component and the generator is merely trained to produce
contrastive samples. We train them both simultaneously and
use only the discriminator in CFAM.
In CEBGAN, the generator and the discriminator are
conditioned on camera input images. The conditional image
x feature vector is computed by passing the image through
a series of convolutional layers. In our experiments with
indoor (UGV) and outdoor (Udacity) datasets, the images are
all first rescaled to size 3x128x128 and the best performer
discriminator used 6 convolution layers for image feature
extraction in both generator and discriminator. The number
of kernels in the first, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth
convolution layers are 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256 respectively
and kernels size is fixed to 4x4 and applied with stride 2.
Before each convolution layer, spatial batch normalization
is performed and LeakyReLU activations with 0.2 negative
slope are used for all layers except for the output, which uses
Tanh.The obtained feature map is then reshaped as a vector.
In generator, the noise input z is mapped to a fully
connected hidden layer of size same as that of the feature
vector computed on the condition image to allow their
summation. Then, in both, the summation of these vectors is
mapped to another fully connected hidden layer before it is
reduced to a single output neuron as shown in Figure 2.
2) Training methodology: In CEBGAN, the discriminator
is trained with an objective function in order to shape the
energy function to attribute low energies to correct steering
commands and high energies to the generated (or anomalous)
commands. We use different loss functions to train the
discriminator and the generator. Given a positive margin
m, a condition image x, true steering command u, and
generated steering command G(z), the discriminator loss LD
and generator loss LG are defined as:
LD(u, z, x) = D(u, x) + [m−D(G(z), x)]+ (1)
LG(z, x) = D(G(z), x) (2)
where D(u, x) is discriminator output and [.]+ = max(0, .).
The generator and discriminator parameters are optimized
using Adam optimizer.
3) Anomaly detection framework: The real-time CFAM
module consists of a discriminator trained as described
in Section III-A.2. Given a condition image xt, energies
(discriminator outputs) are computed for N linearly spaced
equi-distant points in the steering commands values range.
The validity of the incoming sensor data is determined by
computing the steering command deviation as the magnitude
of the difference of the controller output (steering command)
and the corresponding minimum energy steering command
value. Anomalies are associated with data points with devi-
ation greater than the threshold.
B. Adversarially learned action conditioned video prediction
1) Model architecture: Learning-based video prediction
has been used in various control applications [18]–[21].
Fig. 3. Video prediction based SFAM: It consists of a video prediction
generator architecture, dissimilarity computation, and validation modules.
The SFAM in Figure 3 consists of an action conditioned
video prediction architecture shown in Figure 4, dissimilar-
ity computation module, and validation module. The video
prediction architecture is based on the four-layer Prednet
[22]. Each layer has four sub-modules: (1) convolution, (2)
prediction representation, (3) recurrent representation, and
(4) error representation.
All convolutions have 3x3 kernels and max-pooling of
stride 2x2 with kernel size 2x2. The number of output
convolution channels per layer for prediction and target rep-
resentation sub-modules are 3, 32, 48, and 64, respectively.
The inputs to the network are a sequence of images xt and
the steering commands ut+1 at the next time step as shown
in Figure 5. Each layer l at time step t has prediction Aˆlt
and target representations Alt, generated by the prediction
and convolution sub-modules. At the first layer, the target
representation Alt is the actual frame. In layers 2, 3, 4 the
target representation is generated by the convolution sub-
module with the error representation from the previous layer
El−1t . The convolution sub-module has a convolution layer
with ReLU nonlinearity followed by max-pooling layer.
The prediction representation Aˆlt is generated from the
recurrent representation of the current layer Rlt as input to
the prediction sub-module. The prediction module consists
of a convolution layer with ReLU non-linearity except for at
the first layer where it is followed by a SatLU non-linearity
to saturate the values to the maximum pixel intensity values.
The recurrent representation layer that generates Rlt is
a convolutional LSTM whose inputs are the error repre-
sentation from the previous time step of the same layer
Elt−1 combined with the upsampled output of the recurrent
representation of the higher layer Rl+1t . The hidden state is
the recurrent representation from prior time step Rlt−1.
The error representation Elt is generated by combining the
feature maps of the difference between the prediction Aˆlt and
the target Alt and the target A
l
t and the prediction Aˆ
l
t followed
by a ReLU nonlinearity. In the first time step, all error
representations are reset to zero. The steering command is
introduced at the next time step ut+1 as the input to generate
action conditioned frame prediction. It is concatenated with
the error representation of the fourth layer by tiling the
steering command to the same dimension and used as input
to the fourth recurrent representation layer.
2) Training methodology: The video prediction architec-
ture takes as input four RGB images xt−3:t (scaled between
0 and 1) from a monocular camera of resolution 120x160 and
steering commands ut−2:t+1 to predict the frame xˆt+1. The
training has two stages: error representation minimization
and adversarial optimization. The weights are updated using
an Adam optimizer with a base learning rate of 0.001.
The loss function for the error representation minimization
consists of the average of all error representation Elt at each
time step t and at each layer l, the negative of structural
similarity (SSIM) (kernel size=5) between the predicted
frame xˆt+1 and the actual frame xt+1 and the SSIM between
the predicted frame xˆt+1 and the previous frame xt. The
weight for the average of all error representation is 0.1. The
weight for structural similarity between actual and predicted
frame is 1. The weight for structural similarity between
previous and predicted frame is 0.5.
Adversarial optimization is introduced to curtail blurry
prediction images [23]. In this stage, the video prediction
architecture is the generator and is combined with a spec-
trally normalized discriminator [24] with N+1 labels where
one label is the fake/real label and the other labels are N
steering commands as in Figure 5. We use 15 equally spaced
labels for steering command actions for both indoor and
Udacity dataset with range from −0.24 to 0.28 and from
−0.52 to 0.56 respectively. The discriminator consists of nine
spectrally normalized convolution layers with LeakyReLU
non-linearity with negative slope of 0.1 in between all of
them and a kernel size alternating between 3x3 and 4x4
with stride of 1x1 and 2x2, respectively and a spectrally
normalized fully connected layer, which outputs a vector of
size 16. The GAN is trained based on the technique proposed
in [25] with an additional regularization term as described
in [6] to make it robust to out-of-distribution samples.
The regularization term added while updating the genera-
tor parameters is KL(U(s)||Pθ(s|G(zi)) where U(s) is the
uniform distribution of the steering command labels s, G
is the generator, zi is the video prediction network input,
and θ are the parameters of the generator. This term forces
the generator to output out-of-distribution samples which are
in the low data density region. The generator is updated by
minimizing the weighted sum of cross entropy loss (fake/real,
action likelihood estimate) and the KL divergence term
introduced above with weights randomly generated between
0-1.
3) Anomaly detection framework: The video predic-
tion framework in Figure 4 generates video predictions
xˆt+1|ut+1 = si where i ∈ [1, N ]. These video predictions
are input to the dissimilarity computation module as shown
in Figure 3 which calculates the dissimilarity ((1-SSIM)/2)
of the prediction with the actual future frame. These dissim-
ilarities are input to the validation module which selects the
action corresponding to the least dissimilar predicted frame
and compares it with the actual future action to validate
the mapping from the actuator command (system action) to
sensor data. A windowing strategy using multiple prediction
frames validates system actions → sensor data mapping.
Fig. 4. Deep predictive coding based action conditioned video prediction architecture.
Fig. 5. Adversarial training architecture for video prediction based on
GAN for SFAM.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES
A. Datasets
We empirically validated CFAM and SFAM on indoor
and outdoor datasets. The indoor dataset is collected by a
human controller driving a UGV in a corridor with varying
lighting conditions and changing obstacle placements [2],
[26]. The Udacity dataset [14] has images recorded while
driving on highways and residential roads (with and without
lane markings) in clear weather during daytime and includes
driver’s activities such as staying in and switching lanes.
B. Simulated Scenarios
Datasets of RGB camera images and the correspond-
ing steering commands for various anomalous and non-
anomalous scenarios were created. To simulate anomalous
scenarios due to malfunctions/anomalies in the controller or
the external system, the controller output was overridden
by a human driver to create anomalous driving conditions.
To test CFAM, the human-created anomalous inputs were
provided to the CFAM as controller-generated commands.To
test SFAM, the actual controller-generated, correct steering
commands and the sensor data that was recorded when the
robotic vehicle was actually given the overridden steering
commands were provided to the SFAM.
Two complementary anomalous datasets were simulated
by the human driver for the UGV in the indoor environment
resulting in late-right and early-left crash into a wall. In
the late-right turn scenario, the driver provided steering
commands to the vehicle to go straight when the vehicle has
to take a right turn. In the early-left crash case, the driver
provided steering commands to move towards left when the
vehicle has to go straight.
Fig. 6. Real time anomaly detection when UGV takes a late right turn. Left:
controller anomaly detected by CFAM; Right: system anomaly detected by
SFAM. In each of these plots, the difference between the controller output
and the steering command corresponding to minimum dissimilarity score
is plotted as a function of time. By thresholding on the magnitude of this
difference, instantaneous anomalies are detected (red dots) and an overall
anomaly detection trigger signal is generated.
CFAM and SFAM performance for non-anomalous sce-
narios are shown in Figures 7 and 10, respectively and for
anomalous scenarios in Figures 8 and 11, respectively. The
predictions generated by the video prediction architecture
in SFAM with varying lighting are shown in Figure 9. By
using a threshold on the deviation between the actual steering
command and the steering command corresponding to mini-
mum dissimilarity score, a boolean value of anomalous/non-
anomalous can be generated as shown in Figure 6.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Our proposed framework is successfully able to contin-
uously validate the mappings from sensor data to actuator
command and actuator command to (future) sensor data to
detect anomalies/malfunctions in the overall system.
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